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Review Essay

Commanding Military Power
Robert L. Bateman

I

distinctly recall the warning given by my first instructor in computer
programming. “Remember,” he said, “the computer will do exactly as
it is told. It will ‘compute’ any values you place into it, in exactly the
manner that you tell it to. So if it’s garbage that goes in, it’s garbage that
comes out.” I did not know at the time that this is such a truism among
computer scientists that it even has an acronym, GIGO.
War By Numbers, written by the head of the DuPuy Institute
Christopher Lawrence, consists largely of graphs and charts that purport
to demonstrate the effects of various factors upon combat success ratios.
The book does not attempt to develop a new theory of war, per se, but
claims that, its author “establishes what we know about conventional
combat and why we know it. By demonstrating the impact of a variety
of factors have on combat he moves such analysis beyond the work of
Clausewitz and into modern data and interpretation” (back cover). No
matter how you slice it that is a pretty lofty claim.
Unfortunately, in reaching for this “understanding” Lawrence
exclusively uses databases created by the DuPuy Institute and formulas
that are uniquely their own. And that is the insurmountable problem
with War By Numbers, one that undercuts any claim it might have to
move beyond Clausewitz. In this book there is a near complete lack of
transparency and, therefore, also of reproducibility of the research or
the means of analysis. The endnotes that do exist (and some chapters
have only five or eight) are almost completely self-referential to yet other
DuPuy Institute studies (available for a fee of course). In other words,
we cannot tell what has gone into their computer analysis at all, and we
have no insights as to what their computer algorithms may be. Thus, we
cannot tell if there have been any mistakes, we have no idea what the
quality of the research supporting those databases might be, or in almost
all cases even what the original historical sources might have been. All of
this information is proprietary to the institute, and if you want access, it
will cost you tens of thousands of dollars, though what a customer might
get for that money is unclear.
Like Isaac Asimov’s character Hari Seldon and that other wonderful
manipulator of reality, the Wizard of Oz, Lawrence hides his workings
(and data) behind a curtain. In essence what he has done is produce charts
and tables that show how the DuPuy Institute’s computer-based projections match the “historical reality.” But there is no way to determine if
there is real and viable source material underneath these projections, or
if some of the numbers have been fudged in order to make the outcome
appear to match what they alone declare was the historical reality. Thus,
a reader is effectively required to believe their de facto assertion, “trust
us, we know more than you do.”
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In short, what this book amounts to is a massive piece of corporate
advertisement for the real money-maker for the Dupuy Institute, their
contracted studies. It is a 374 page infomercial. But the kicker is that it is
one that you are expected to pay for the privilege of reading.
In distinct contrast, there stands a new work of theory. It is supported with reproducible research, as well as a call for other academics
to further the examination of the theory through the case studies presented. Ryan Grauer’s Commanding Military Power is a solid work fusing
evidence with a theory that seeks to explain. It is a book that professional
soldiers, academic historians (and for that matter amateur historians),
international relations specialists and politicians should read, consider,
and as far as possible replicate and develop.
One of the most fruitful methods of advancing our incomplete
understanding of war, in all permutations, is to introduce new intellectual
concepts borrowed from other fields to help us make sense of the chaos
of war. Clifford Rodgers quite successfully advanced the understanding
of “military revolutions” by importing the genetic/biological idea of
“punctuated equilibrium” in the 1990s. Clausewitz himself borrowed
from then-developing ideas from the field of physics when he used the
concept of “friction.” Now Grauer, leaning upon the work of organizational theorists, (a field which heretofore dealt almost exclusively with
business, economics, and political science) does the same to great effect.
In Commanding Military Power, Grauer initially observes that “from
a theoretical perspective, no extant model of military power incorporates armed forces capacities to cope with and overcome the effects of
uncertainty in combat” (9). To fill this gap he proposes something he
calls “command structure theory.” Simply stated, Grauer proposes that
the best way to examine historical conflicts is to study and analyze the
means that armed forces used to organize and manage information and
uncertainty on the battlefield. This method, he argues, allows one to
understand how much combat power that force may be able to generate
in a given conflict. By adjusting components of command structure,
such as the ratios of subordinates to leaders, the degree of centralization
in decision making, and the communications network used to transmit
and process data, a military force can match its structure to the particular environment in which it is fighting.
In developing his arguments, he examines four unique case studies,
at least for Western readers. The first is a campaign from the RussoJapanese War, the second is from the Chinese Civil War, while the third
and fourth both come from the latter phases of the Korean War. Each
case study is well researched, leans heavily upon primary sources, and
is worth reading alone. But more importantly, because they are studies
with reproducible research, they are open to critique and revision.
Indeed, that is much of the point of the work. Grauer is explicit in this.
Unlike Lawrence, he clearly invites readers and scholars to cross-check
his work, unpack and engage with the theory he presents, and take that
theory to the next level by applying it to other historical case studies
for comparison and refinement. That is how scholarship is supposed
to work.
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